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In the mid-nineties, Routledge brought out The Mechanical Mind. Authored by Tim 
Crane, this was a readable introduction, overview and rationale for approaching the 
philosophy of mind from a particular outlook. Specifically, it identified and defended 
the core and foundational assumptions that inform mainstream analytic philosophy of 
mind. The book advanced a kind of ‘ideological argument’ in that its author recognized 
that attraction to its central idea “depends on accepting a certain picture of the world; 
the mechanical/causal world picture. This picture sees the whole of nature as obeying 
certain general causal laws – the laws of physics, chemistry, biology, etc. – and it holds 
that psychology too has its laws, and that the mind fits into the causal order” (Crane 
1995, p. 62). 
Endorsement of causalism about the mind lay at the heart of this view. Thus 
Crane acknowledged, “the causal picture of thought is the key element in what I am 
calling the ‘mechanical’ view of the mind” (Crane 1995, p. 58). Mental life is, 
accordingly, not merely expressed or made manifest in what certain living creatures do; 
rather to adopt the kind of causalist understanding of the mind (that is today widely 
accepted) is to think of mental states as productive. They do the behind the scenes toil 
that brings about and reliably generates experience and thought. Thematically, it is easy 
to see how acceptance of this sort of functionalist characterization of the mental, as a 
collection of causally efficacious ‘inner states’, is linked with other standard notions 
that are axiomatic for analytic philosophers of mind. For example, it fits neatly with the 
idea that mental states are not directly perceptible but at best inferred. Typically, this 
last thought is combined with yet another, the claim that putative mental states are, in 
fact, theoretical entities of the kind that are either familiarly described by commonsense 
psychology or which our best scientific psychology seeks to identify. 
Of course, there is – as yet – no exact agreement about what our best scientific 
psychology is or ought to be. Yet, exactitude aside, in certain circles there is broad 
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must have. Thus “the cognitivist research programme is unified primarily by the core 
assumptions about the complexity and representational nature of mind, and by very little 
shared substantive doctrine” (Flanagan 1991, p. 179). Although there have been many 
variations on the basic theme (indeed some going to remarkable extremes), the bottom 
line commitment of analytic philosophy of mind, shared by cognitive scientists, is that – 
in some way or another – the mind is responsible for the production of intelligent 
activity by means of manipulating representations computationally. For many thinkers, 
this much cognitivism (at least) is a non-negotiable starting point for an adequate 
understanding and study of the mental. As such this sort of approach to the mind stands 
in stark and hostile contrast to scientific behaviourism, its forerunner in psychology, and 
certain philosophical attempts to cast the mind as essentially expressive, embodied and 
embedded within its environment in constitutive ways.1  
Gallagher and Zahavi’s The Phenomenal Mind is meant to be the 21st century 
reply to this entrenched and dominant line of thinking about the mental. Indeed when I 
was asked to give my opinion of the pre-publication manuscript, the senior editor at 
Routledge cast it in just this light; it was meant to be compared directly to The 
Mechanical Mind (the similarity in titles is no accident) and the framework promoted 
therein. For times have changed, debates about the mind, its nature and how to study it 
have moved on in interesting ways from where we were over a decade ago. Hence The 
Phenomenal Mind (PM) is not only supposed to be a rich and philosophically exciting 
introduction into what phenomenology is and why it matters, it is also a manifesto 
designed to show why current thinking about the philosophy of mind cannot afford to 
neglect the offerings of the phenomenological tradition. It succeeds brilliantly in this. 
The book’s greatest virtue is not just that it gives a sense of what is distinctive about 
phenomenological approaches but also maps out their place in the big picture. The 
individual chapters (all well written) enter into discussions that are gripping and which 
unfold in ways that draw in the reader, providing insight into both the character of and 
the need for the various phenomenological contributions. Collectively, they reveal that 
only by taking phenomenology seriously will important problems become properly 
visible and new ways of approaching old problems emerge.  
                                                          
1 Not every kind of functionalism is straightforwardly incompatible with embodied-embedded 
approaches, at least not in every respect. For a recent attempt to combine the latter with an extended 
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There can be no doubt that this sort of work is timely and much-needed. But 
readers may have reason to wonder whether the expressed ‘overarching’ claim of this 
book, as stated, truly indicates the revolutionary nature of the work. It is “that these 
phenomenological-based theoretical accounts and descriptions can complement and 
inform ongoing work in the cognitive sciences. In fact, we do think they can do so in a 
far more productive manner than the standard metaphysical discussions of, say, the 
mind-body problem that we find in mainstream philosophy of mind” (Gallagher and 
Zahavi 2007, p. 10, emphasis added). The authors are not shy of critiquing analytic 
philosophers. For example, the introduction reveals that the latter are unclear even about 
the details of the recent history of the science of mind and often their own motives for 
rejecting certain positions and endorsing others. 
But really the problems with what we might call the Mechano-
Representationalist Approach (or MRA) run much deeper still. Indeed, they run so deep 
that it is difficult to see how the insights conveyed in PM could merely ‘complement 
and inform’ the existing work in the cognitive sciences in the absence of a fundamental 
philosophical reform of the latter. After all, the so-called cognitive sciences tend to aid 
and abet the core assumptions of the MRA that are plainly and directly antithetical to 
the ‘Phenomenal Approach’ to the mind (or PA). If so, there is a tension in the 
overarching claim that warrants comment and clarification. 
Let me be clear, PM admirably demonstrates the contemporary need for 
phenomenology to inform the empirical sciences of the mind, but it blatantly supposes 
that its proposals can peacefully co-exist with those of science because the two domains 
are autonomous and non-competitive (see, e.g. p. 7, where it is held that 
phenomenology comes at things from the first-person perspective and cognitive science 
from the third-person perspective). With this sort of division of labour in mind, chapter 
two on ‘Methodologies’ shows that the common myth that phenomenology is hostile to 
scientific approaches is just that, a myth. There is little doubt that since it is just this 
misconception that turns many away from phenomenology, the authors decided to 
tackle that issue up front. 
The fact is that while phenomenology and pure neuroscience may co-operate 
well, it is less obvious that the same is true of phenomenology and cognitive science. 
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description (into which we have no first-personal insight or access) but they 
nevertheless focus on phenomena above the level of interest to neuroscientists, who are 
concerned with the ground floor mechanics and implementation of mental activity. The 
root trouble is that in pursuing its own agenda, cognitive science seeks to operate with a 
mixed economy: it aims to give us theories at the subpersonal level that explain 
everyday psychological phenomena while at the same time incorporating and revising 
constructs from that very domain. Thus it offers computational or functionalist theories 
of perception, memory and thought that invoke notions of ‘content’ and ‘experience’ in 
ways that put its enterprise directly at odds with certain, non-theoretically laden 
phenomenological insights. This being so, it certainly seems that PA and MRA are 
straightforwardly incompatible. And if we take the commitment to some form of 
‘representational theory of mind’ as central to cognitive science, the discussions of 
many chapters of PM make this tension abundantly clear.  
For example, in several places throughout the book its authors state that their 
position, concerning central topics, such as perception and intentionality, is opposed to 
“the representationalist account of the mind” (Gallagher and Zahavi, 2007, p. 94). Yet 
in other places they talk in ways that can make it appear that they are less than fully 
hostile to the sorts of information-processing approaches that think of perceptual data as 
a kind of input that is received and manipulated (e.g. they say ‘perception is not a 
simple reception of information’ which seems to imply that it at least partly involves the 
simple reception of information; ‘experiences present the world in a certain way’ and so 
on). There are several such instances for the attentive reader to find. It might be thought 
that this is unproblematic. After all, such talk is, of course, the norm in the cognitive 
sciences. But for those who reject the MRA to mental states, such language deserves – 
nay, requires – critical reconsideration. It is not clear why the authors did not 
consistently distance themselves more entirely from their competitor’s theory of the 
mind.  
To take another example, the authors are quite happy to talk of mental states 
exhibiting intentionality or aboutness (Gallagher and Zahavi, 2007, p. 111) but they 
deny that the distinction of the inner and the outer, normally invoked when talking of 
our situatedness in the world, makes good sense. Now to talk of mental states does not 
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overlooked that subtle but important difference. The interesting point, however, is that if 
one takes to heart the arguments against taking the inner-outer distinction seriously, 
then the very idea of an inner mental state is put into hazard. Let me be clear, the 
tension in question is not with the idea that there are mental states exhibiting 
distinguishing features, such as aboutness, but with the idea that we have any principled, 
metaphysically robust understanding of what it is for such a state to be ‘inner’. Again, 
accepting this demands a fundamental rethink of many standard claims made by 
cognitive scientists.  
Other examples of this tension could be supplied, but the general point ought to 
be clear enough. The description of the book’s core claim appears to seriously 
underdescribe the true threat that PA, properly understood, offers to existing cognitive 
science. In this respect, I would have liked to see the authors go further in making clear 
just how revolutionary their ideas and proposals really are. This, in turn, may require a 
rethink of their stated ambitions. 
There is one other matter I would like to see clarified. Another of the authors’ 
stated aims of the PA is that it seeks to be “non-dogmatic, shunning metaphysical and 
theoretical prejudices” (Gallagher and Zahavi, 2007, p. 10). The authors of PM don’t 
demur from theorising, but they do seek to avoid prejudice. But it is not clear that they 
have always and everywhere been sufficiently critical and managed to free themselves 
from certain favoured habits of thought. If this should prove true, it raises interesting 
methodological questions about the role of theorizing and what grounds it in the PA. 
Gallagher and Zahavi make constitutive claims about what is putatively 
essentially required for the having of experiences. They maintain that all experience is 
necessarily self-conscious, where the form of self-consciousness in question is 
understood in a minimal, pre-reflexive sense. First-person givenness, manifesting a 
quality of felt mineness, reveals experiences to have an implicit self-consciousness that 
is essential and basic to any and all experience.  
I have reservations about the existence of a minimal form of self-consciousness 
that is in some way integral to any and all experience, even if only pre-reflexively, 
tacitly or implicitly. This is because I have trouble understanding what justifies 
characterizing any pre-reflexive felt aspect that might be associated with such 
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Some distinctions are in order. A condition on the possibility of knowing (or 
recognizing) that one has a point of view is that one is able to recognize and contrast it 
with other points of view (at least possibly). It would seem then, on the one hand, that 
one can only understand that having of first-personal and third-personal perspectives by 
first operating with concepts that are only made available in a second-personal, social 
space; a public, intersubjective space. On the other hand, it seems right to say that one 
can have experiences even if one does not know it. A creature can experience even if it 
lacks the concept of experience.  
Noting this difference helps to explain how we can talk of experience as being, 
in one sense, shared and in another sense private. You and I can both have experience of 
a common object or situation. We might have qualitatively similar experiences of it (in 
certain circumstances) but we would not have exactly the same experience of it, 
quantitatively speaking. Token experiences ‘belong’ to the individuals in question even 
if we can only recognize them as so belonging (as being first-personal) from a second-
person point of view.  
So it seems that one cannot recognize or understand what it is to have a first-
personal kind of experience unless one is able to operate with appropriate, 
intersubjectively grounded concepts (specifically, the concept of experience). This 
doesn’t preclude the having of non-conceptual feelings or experience per se (there are 
many sorts of experiences that one might have prior to mastering the concept of 
experience). But it raises questions about our justification for characterizing these in 
terms of feelings of ‘mineness’ or ‘first-personal givenness’. For what entitles us to 
employ these sorts of characterization in describing the felt character of such 
experiences to experiencers who lack the ability to make the relevant conceptual 
distinctions?  
It might be thought that we have no choice but to accept that first-person self-
consciousness is fundamental to all forms of consciousness; i.e. that first-person 
givenness is a constitutive aspect of consciousness, without which there could be no 
experience at all. Thus it might be argued that unless we presuppose a capacity for 
minimal self-awareness (and thus the existence of a minimal self), experience would be 
‘given to us’ pre-reflexively in an anonymous and undifferentiated manner. But surely 
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experience ‘felt mineness’ in the first place. If so, there would simply be no question of 
understanding their quality in terms of a felt difference of ‘mineness’ (or its opposite). 
The trouble with that idea and its alternate (anonymous feelings) is that they both seem 
to imply some capacity, if only nonconceptual, for recognizing a difference between 
one’s own experiences and those of others. How could one experience things in this 
way without having some appropriate contrast? And if this is not implied it becomes 
even harder to make sense of what ‘felt mineness’ might consist in.  
It is for reasons of this kind that I am suspicious of characterizing experience in 
terms of first-personal givenness and in seeing this as a necessary ingredient of minimal 
self-consciousness. As Wittgenstein once said (paraphrasing), solipsism may truly 
describe our psychological situation but any attempt to state this truth would constitute 
nonsense. It might be thought that attempts to talk about a pre-reflexive quality of 
minenesss that features in our experiences faces logically similar obstacles. But the 
concern I am raising is more fundamental, since I have yet to see why we should be 
persuaded of the truth of the description, full stop. 
Note that since my point concerns what justifies (or not) a certain way of 
characterizing our experiences, it does not follow that experiences would be ownerless 
if we rejected such a characterization as unwarranted. Experiences may have owners 
(they may even have owners, necessarily) but whether the owners of experiences 
experience their experiences as being owned or themselves as being owners of them is a 
quite different question.2 
Down the ages, great minds have recognized and explored the idea that sentient 
life incorporates a distinctive and elusive feature – a feature that cannot be wholly 
captured in terms of the qualitative character associated with what the individual senses 
are designed to track when performing their offices in enabling creatures to navigate the 
external world. From Aristotle onwards, rich attention has been paid to this alleged 
                                                          
2 Some philosophers, such as Galen Strawson take the claim that selves must exist to be a truism. 
Following in the footsteps of Frege, he insists that we must answer ‘No’ to the question, “Can there be 
experience without someone to experience it?” (Strawson 1994, p. 129). Note that: “A subject of 
experience is not something grand. It is simply something that must exist wherever there is experience, 
even in the case of mice or spiders – simply because experience is necessarily experience-for” (Strawson 
1994, p. 133). Strawson also bids us to recognize that as stated Frege’s thesis is compatible with the idea 
that there is a different subject of experience attending each experience. Note that Strawson is not 
committed to the existence of long-term selves as single entities existing over the course of whole human 
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sense (or feeling) of living, of existing, of one’s lived body (Heller-Roazen 2007). The 
feeling in question purportedly is that which attends all unimpaired sentient activity 
(and possibly even its absence) – it has been thought of as a kind of animal feeling, that 
can be disrupted or made evident by certain psychological and medical disorders. 
Amongst the many diverse attempts to formulate and understand the nature of this 
special kind of sentience, it has been variously equated with certain functions assigned 
to the Aristotelian common sense, a central or master faculty that presides over and 
unifies the perceptual activity, a kind of inner touch or sensitivity, and as a form of 
apperception (distinct from explicit consciousness). What unites the great bulk of these 
attempts has been the idea that the feeling or sensation in question is non-intellectual 
and pre-cognitive in character. Even so, no two thinkers managed to corral the notion or 
render it intelligible in precisely equivalent ways. Perhaps that’s to be expected, given 
the quarry. Indeed, allowing certain amount of latitude on this front is probably wise 
when trying to understand a sensation or feeling that only manifests pre-reflexively.  
This suggests that talk of ‘minimal self-consciousness’ gestures at something 
that needs to be understood. What I am proposing is that the particular modes of 
expression that the authors of PM invoke to characterize this may be in need of review; 
certainly they want careful interrogation and explication. This request trades on the 
authors’ (quite healthy) admission that we should be on our guard against potentially 
misleading metaphors and that there is always room for improvement in the language 
used to express phenomenological insights. To be sure, this is an on-going process and 
one that will divide thinkers, even those sympathetic to the PA.  
Importantly, any adjustment on this score could impact on the discussion of 
selves in Chapter 10 (which provides an excellent, concise and sorely needed overview 
of the different ways of understanding selves and persons philosophically). In that 
Chapter, it is argued that we can identify and should acknowledge the existence of a 
core or minimal self. This kind of self is not one that is ‘opposed to’ (or which can be 
distinguished cleanly from) subjective experiential activity, rather it is integral to it. 
Thus “the (minimal or core) self possesses experiential reality, and is in fact identified 
with the first-personal appearance of the experiential phenomena” (Gallagher and 
Zahavi 2007, p. 204, emphasis original). Once again, the elusive quality of ‘mineness’ is 
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constant throughout all experience. Experiences are ‘felt as’ or ‘experienced as’ mine, 
hence they “carry a subtle presence of self” (Gallagher and Zahavi 2007, p. 204). First-
personal givenness, an essential part of every phenomenal experience, therefore also 
encourages taking seriously the existence of a minimal self. 
Although the authors make abundantly clear that the self in question is not a 
Kantian ‘I’ or Cartesian ‘ego’ – and although they also make clear they are adopting a 
non-intellectualist understanding of experience – it is not evident to me, in light of the 
above concerns, that they can so easily help themselves to the idea that basic 
experiences have the quality of feeling to be ‘mine’ as such. And if so, is there any real 
need to posit the existence of selves that have first-person perspectives per se? 
This whole discussion raises a more general question about method. For by what 
means might we decide the right way to jump on this sort of issue? In Chapter three, the 
authors make clear that they, at least sometimes, want to operate by means of 
eliminating the existing theoretical competition. At times, they appear content to operate 
a strategy of supplying theoretical conjectures and inferences to the best explanation, 
seeking to test these somehow and eliminate those that do not stand muster. In the end, 
the last theory standing would be the best explanation (see, for example, their 
exemplary treatment of higher order theories of experience for an illustration of how 
this might work). This sort of thing has been tried many times before in philosophy; 
indeed it is a trademark of the analytic approach. Although, I myself have used it on 
occasion, I am wary of the idea that it can be made to work in all cases (see Hutto 2006 
ch. 6, Hutto 2007). Its use seems especially suspect when it comes to deciding how best 
to characterize experience and its logical requirements. So I am curious to know if, in 
fact, Gallagher and Zahavi are attracted to it when it comes to dealing with the case in 
hand or if they would prefer to adopt a more descriptively-focused approach of the sort 
normally associated with phenomenology. And, if they should choose the latter, I am 
curious to know how they would respond to some of the concerns raised above about 
their preferred characterization of minimal self-consciousness. 
 
Daniel D. Hutto 
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